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“With the right to bear arms comes a great responsibility to use caution 
and common sense . . .and it’s just plain common sense that there be a 
waiting period to allow local law-enforcement officials to conduct 
background checks on those who wish to purchase handguns.”2 
-President Ronald Reagan 
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 1   This title references the long-held rationale of gun rights lobbyists, “The only way to 
stop a bad guy with a gun is with a good guy with a gun,” which NRA Chief Wayne Lapierre 
emphatically stated at a press conference in 2012 following the Sandy Hook massacre. See 
Meghan Keneally, Breaking Down The NRA-Backed Theory That a Good Guy With a Gun 
Stops a Bad Guy With a Gun, ABC NEWS (Oct. 29 2018), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/breaking-nra-backed-theory-good-guy-gun-
stops/story?id=53360480. Meanwhile, the NRA has continually fought legislation regulating 
firearm sales and ownership making it easier for “Bad Guys” to get guns.  See generally Jose 
Pagliery, “NRA Slams Gun-Background System Flaws It Helped Create,” CNN (Feb. 14, 
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/23/us/nra-criticizes-gaps-it-created-in-gun-
background-system-invs/index.html.  
  J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2012, Providence 
College. I would like to thank the Seton Hall Legislative Journal for the care and detail that 
went into publishing this comment. A special thank you to my faculty advisor, Professor 
Margaret Lewis, for her guidance and support throughout the writing process. Finally, I would 
like to thank my wife, Emily, and my family for their patience, inspiration, and unwavering 
support throughout this journey.  
 2   Steven A. Holmes, Gun Control Bill Backed by Reagan in Appeal to Bush, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, Mar. 29, 1991 at A1. In an address at George Washington University marking 
the 10th anniversary of John Hinckley’s unsuccessful assassination attempt that left former 
Reagan Press secretary James Brady severely disabled, former President Reagan – a card 
carrying member of the NRA – endorsed the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act and 
background checks for those seeking to purchase a firearm.  
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I. INTRODUCTION. 
On October 21, 2012, Zina Haughton was enjoying an uneventful 
Sunday morning, chatting and taking care of her regular clients at a day spa 
in suburban Milwaukee.3  Haughton, according to others in the salon at the 
time, seemed remarkably calm and collected when without warning her 
estranged husband entered the salon waving a revolver in the air, screaming 
for everyone to get on the floor.4  This was not the first time, but it would be 
the last time, that Ms. Haughton would fall victim to her husband’s abuse.5  
Radcliffe Haughton, who Zina had previously told a court “terrorize[d) [her] 
every waking moment,” proceeded to murder her as well as two others in the 
spa that morning.  What is arguably worse than Zina’s tragic death, is the 
fact that Mr. Haughton should not have been able to purchase the firearm he 
used to murder her in the first place.6  Federal regulations make it unlawful 
 
 3   Carlos Sadovi, Witness to Salon Attack Says Zina Haughton Tried to Calm Armed 
Man, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Oct. 23, 2012), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-
2012-10-23-ct-met-milwaukee-salon-shooting-sidebar-20121023-story.html.  
 4   Id.  
 5   Michael Cooper, Michael S. Schmidt, & Michael Luo, Loopholes in Gun Laws Allow 
Buyers to Skirt Checks, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 11, 2013), at A14.  
 6   Id. (“When Zina Haughton, 42, got a restraining order against her husband. . .he 
became ineligible to buy a gun under federal law.”).  
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for persons with active restraining orders to purchase firearms.7  Despite 
these restrictions, Mr. Haughton evaded the background checks that would 
have stopped him by exploiting a loophole in federal regulations and 
purchasing his weapon from a private seller.8 
Tragedies like this and countless other untold stories amplify the need 
for lawmakers and the nation to re-evaluate the status of gun control 
legislation and, specifically, the requirement for background checks.9  While 
the national gun violence epidemic has resulted in countless public pleas for 
heightened federal regulation, most gun control legislation has failed to 
garner sufficient congressional support.10  Unfortunately, the political reality 
is that the gun control debate is consistently plagued by partisan politics and 
interest group opposition to any federal regulation.  One area of the 
discussion that has seen bipartisan public support with regularity over the 
last ten years is the concept of universal background checks.11  Polling has 
found that at least ninety percent of Americans are in favor of some type of 
universal background check.12  The overwhelming support for universal 
background checks, met with federal inaction, highlights the failure of 
Congress to address this critical issue despite so many tragedies. 
While Congress remains divided on federal gun control regulation, 
states have implemented the majority of impactful gun control legislation, 
where varying degrees of restrictions have led to similarly diverse results.13  
 
 7   18 U.S.C.S. §922 (d)(8) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise 
dispose of any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe that such person. . .is subject to a court order that restrains such person from harassing, 
stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or 
person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear 
of bodily injury to the partner or child. . .”). 
 8   Cooper, supra note 5. 
 9   See generally, Cooper, supra note 5.   
 10   Melina Delkic, Sandy Hook Anniversary: These Are the Gun Control Laws that Have 
Failed Since the Newtown Shooting, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://www.newsweek.com/sandy-hook-anniversary-gun-control-laws-failed-747415.  
 11   See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Deal to Bolster Gun Background Checks Is Reached by 
Senators, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 17, 2017, at A13; Katie Rogers, Trump Adds Cautious 
Support to Changes to Background Checks for Gun Buyers, THE NEW YORK TIMES A13 (Feb. 
20, 2018).  
 12   Matthew Miller, Lisa Hepburn & Deborah Azrael, “Firearm Acquisition Without 
Background Check”, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 166, 233–239 (2017) (“Universal 
background checks are favored by more than 90% of all Americans.”); Tim Malloy, U.S. 
Support for Gun Control Tops 2-1, Highest Ever, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; 
Let Dreamers Stay, 80 Percent of Voters Say, QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY POLL 1, 1 (2018), 
https://poll.qu.edu/images/polling/us/us02202018_ugbw51.pdf (“Support for universal 
background checks is itself almost universal, 97 – 2 percent, including 97 – 3 percent among 
gun owners.”).  
 13   Ashley Welch, What Impact do State Gun Laws Have on Shooting Deaths?, CBS 
NEWS (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/gun-control-laws-state-impact-on-
shooting-deaths-suicide-study/.  
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Based on the lack of standardization among individual states, state-level 
firearm regulation cannot sufficiently address the nationwide issue of gun 
violence.14  Without uniformity, one state’s weak regulation of firearms can 
undermine the effectiveness of another state’s more comprehensive 
regulation.15  Despite this reality and the significant popular support for 
change, many states still do not require background checks to supplement 
the gaps left by the current construction of federal statutes.16  While 
differences in state-based regulation of firearms transfer can provide 
valuable insight into the effects of various gun control measures without the 
larger risk of failure on a national stage, the priority should be establishing a 
national system of firearm regulations implementing minimum standards for 
universal background checks.17 
This comment will analyze various approaches to background checks 
at the federal and state level and advocate for the adoption of a federal 
requirement for universal background checks on all firearm transfers.  Part 
II will discuss how the history of gun control legislation has shaped the state 
of current firearm regulations.  It will also discuss the significant judicial 
decisions that impact Congress’ ability to regulate firearms, and how those 
decisions both limit and enable the institution of a universal background 
check requirement in the future. 
Part III will analyze the current construction of federal firearm transfer 
regulations, address the background check gap that congress inadvertently 
created for private sales, and discuss congressional and executive actions 
taken to address the issue.  It will then analyze supplementary state level 
firearm regulations from Missouri, Connecticut, and California.  Missouri 
provides a unique example as a state which previously had supplemental 
requirements for background checks but repealed the requirement in 2007.18  
 
 14   Patrick Luff, Regulating Firearms Through Litigation, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1581, 1587 
(2014) (“Although states have also passed gun control measures, state laws can be ineffective 
because, unless there are uniform standards, weak gun controls in one state can undermine 
stronger gun control efforts in other states.”). See Michael de Leeuw, Let Us Talk Past Each 
Other for a While: A Brief Response to Professor Johnson, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1637, 1642–43 
(2013) (describing “the relative ease and anonymity with which people can purchase 
handguns in one state and then transport them elsewhere to sell on the street”). 
 15   Id.  
 16   Miller, supra note 12, at 235 (“State laws regulating private sales as of July 1, 2013 
include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
and Washington, D.C.”).  
 17   See Allen Rostron, A New State Ice Age for Gun Policy, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
327, 360 (Summer 2016). The term “transfer” will be used generally throughout this note to 
represent the sale, purchase, gift, or other means of exchange of firearms between two parties. 
 18   Niraj Chokshi, Study: Repealing Missouri’s Background Check Law Associated With 
a Murder Spike, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 18, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/02/18/study-repealing-missouris-
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Both California and Connecticut have supplemental background check 
requirements, and the comparison of their different approaches will 
demonstrate each version’s strengths and weaknesses. 
Part IV will use the state-based analysis to advocate for the federal 
implementation of a minimum universal background check requirement 
based on aspects of the different states’ approaches.  This section will argue 
that small change in the form of background checks at the point of transfer 
will significantly impact the effectiveness of gun control efforts during 
firearm transfer. 
II. HOW LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE SHAPED MODERN FEDERAL 
FIREARM REGULATIONS. 
Federal requirements for background checks during the transfer of a 
firearm have only been around since the mid-1990s, but the development of 
current regulatory gaps in background check requirements can be traced to 
the early 1900s.19  While congressional authority to regulate firearms is now 
generally recognized, the series of seminal legislative initiatives and judicial 
opinions that follow helped pave the circuitous route that led to the current 
state of firearm regulation.  First, this section will look at how Congress has 
shaped firearm legislation over the last century, laying the foundation for the 
current state of regulatory affairs.  Second, this section will analyze the 
impact the courts have had on limiting those regulations as well as clarifying 
the role of Congress in regulating firearms transfer and ownership. 
A. Legislative History of Federal Regulation on Firearm Transfers. 
The National Firearms Act of 1934 (“NFA”) was the first major piece 
of federal gun control legislation passed concerning the transfer of 
firearms.20  Congress enacted the NFA to regulate the manufacture, import, 
and transfer of specific firearms as defined in the act.21  The NFA “imposed 
a tax on the making and transfer of firearms defined by the Act, as well as a 
special (occupational) tax on persons and entities engaged in the business of 
importing, manufacturing, and dealing in NFA firearms.”22  The Act also 
required the registration of all NFA classified weapons with the secretary of 
the treasury.23  While enacted under Congress’ taxing powers, the NFA was 
 
background-check-law-associated-with-a-murder-spike/?utm_term=.67c039babc26.  
 19   See Sarah Gray, Here’s a Timeline of the Major Gun Control Laws in America, TIME 
(Feb. 22, 2018), http://time.com/5169210/us-gun-control-laws-history-timeline/.  
 20   Id.  
 21   Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, “National Firearms Act”, 
(Last visited Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/national-firearms-act. 
 22   Id.  
 23   Id. (“The law also required the registration of all NFA firearms with the Secretary of 
the Treasury. Firearms subject to the 1934 Act included shotguns and rifles having barrels 
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not intended for revenue collection and instead targeted an alternative goal, 
to deter the use and transfer of weapons that were often used in crimes and 
episodes of gang violence.24  This Act imposed a duty not only on all 
transfers of the regulated weapons, but required persons possessing the 
weapons to retroactively register them.25 
The Federal Firearms Act of 1938 (“FFA”) developed a regulatory 
framework for licensing firearms dealers that is the schematic for the modern 
system.26  The FFA required persons “engaged in the business” of importing, 
manufacturing, or dealing firearms to acquire federal firearms licenses 
(“FFL”) from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 
(“ATF”).27  The FFA also prohibited classes of people from purchasing or 
possessing firearms, most notably at this time convicted felons.28  Not only 
was it a federal offense for convicted felons to purchase or possess a firearm, 
but it was also a federal offense for any firearms dealer to knowingly transfer 
a firearm to these prohibited purchasers.29 
Significantly, in 1968 the Supreme Court held that the NFA provision 
requiring firearm owners to register their firearms was unconstitutional.30  
The Haynes decision left the NFA essentially unenforceable, forcing 
Congress to amend Title II of the NFA by enacting Title II of the Gun Control 
Act (“GCA”) of 1968.31  The amendments cured constitutional defects 
present in the NFA and also repealed the FFA, adopting many of its 
 
less than 18 inches in length, certain firearms described as “any other weapons,” 
machineguns, and firearm mufflers and silencers.”).  
 24   Id. (“Congress found these firearms to pose a significant crime problem because of 
their frequent use in crime, particularly the gangland crimes of that era such as the St. 
Valentine’s Day Massacre. The $200 making and transfer taxes on most NFA firearms were 
considered quite severe and adequate to carry out Congress’ purpose to discourage or 
eliminate transactions in these firearms. The $200 tax has not changed since 1934.”). 
 25   Id.  
 26   James Jacobs & Zoe Fuhr, The Potential and Limitations of Universal Background 
Checking for Gun Purchasers, 7 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 537, 539 (2017). 
 27   Id. (citing Federal Firearms Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 785, §3(b), 52 Stat. 1250, 1251 
(1938)). Notably, the FFA failed to define “engaged in the business” which would leave the 
door open for interpretation in later statutes, leading to the private sales exception that plagues 
gun control regulation today.   
 28   Id.  
 29   Id. 
 30   Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 99–100 (1968) (holding that the provisions of 
the NFA were unconstitutional on their face, and that a requirement for a felon, who would 
become punishable as a prohibited owner of a firearm, to register the firearm would violate 
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).  
 31   Gray, supra note 19; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 
“National Firearms Act”, (Last visited Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-
regulations/national-firearms-act (“In 1971, the Supreme Court reexamined the NFA in 
the Freed case and found that the 1968 amendments cured the constitutional defect in the 
original NFA.”). 
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provisions under the new legislation.32  The GCA “regulated interstate and 
foreign commerce in firearms, including importation, ‘prohibited persons’, 
and licensing provisions.”33  In the wake of significant acts of gun violence 
during the civil rights movement, specifically the assassinations of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the GCA 
implemented strict regulations establishing new firearms offenses, as well as 
expanding the classes of prohibited purchasers to include felons, the 
mentally ill, and unlawful users of narcotics, among others.34  The primary 
effect of the initial GCA language on the future of background checks was 
to incorporate the former FFA requirement for “persons engaged in the 
business” of manufacturing, distributing, and dealing firearms to obtain 
FFLs.35 
In 1983, Congress passed the Firearms Owners Protection Act 
(“FOPA”), a significant indicator of the country’s conservative ideological 
shift and the growing influence of the National Rifle Association (“NRA”).36  
In dramatic shift from how the legislation had been interpreted in the past, 
FOPA re-defined the “engaged in the business” provision as only applying 
to, 
“a person who devotes time, attention, and labor to 
dealing [manufacturing, or distributing] in firearms as a 
regular course of trade or business with the principal 
objective of livelihood and profit through the repetitive 
purchase and resale of firearms, but such term shall not 
include a person who makes occasional sales, exchanges, or 
purchases of firearms for the enhancement of a personal 
collection or for a hobby, or who sells all or part of his 
personal collection of firearms.”37 
The bill also enacted other limitations on gun control initiatives by 
prohibiting a requirement for national registration of dealer’s firearm sale 
 
 32   Gray, supra note 19; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 
“National Firearms Act”, (Last visited Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-
regulations/national-firearms-act (“In 1971, the Supreme Court reexamined the NFA in 
the Freed case and found that the 1968 amendments cured the constitutional defect in the 
original NFA.”). 
 33   Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, “Gun Control Act of 1968”, 
(Last visited Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/gun-control-act. 
 34   Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 539–40.   
 35   18 U.S.C. § 923(a) (West 2018) (“No person shall engage in the business of 
importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or importing or manufacturing ammunition, 
until he has filed an application with and received a license to do so from the Attorney 
General.”).  
 36   Luff, supra note 14, at 1588–89.  
 37   18 U.S.C § 921(a) (21) (emphasis added); Luff, supra note 14, at 1588–89. 
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records, and by allowing licensed dealers to participate in gun shows.38 
Following the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan in 
1981, which left White House Press Secretary James Brady permanently 
disabled, a movement back towards liberal application of gun control 
emerged, culminating in the passage of the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act of 1993 (“Brady Act”).39  The Brady Act significantly 
modified the GCA by requiring that all FFL dealers conduct background 
checks on purchasers to ensure they were not prohibited from purchasing a 
firearm.40  Viewed in light of current amendments and other proposed 
changes, opinions on effectiveness of the initial Brady Act have been 
mixed.41 
The Brady Act was seen as important because it established the 
requirement that all federally licensed firearm dealers, manufacturers, and 
distributors institute a waiting period between purchase of the firearm and 
transfer to the purchaser, which Congress viewed as a strategy to prevent 
heat of passion firearm purchases intended for violence.42  The waiting 
period required chief local law enforcement officers (“CLEO”) to process 
the purchaser’s application, conduct a background check, and within five 
business days inform the FFL whether or not the sale could proceed.43  If the 
CLEO did not inform the FFL within five business days that the purchaser 
was a prohibited person, the FFL had the discretion to proceed with the 
sale.44 
After five years, the Act required that the waiting period would be 
replaced by a national background checking system, which led to the creation 
of the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).45  The 
initial Brady Act only applied to handguns but eventually the requirement 
for FFLs to conduct NICS background checks would also apply to “long-
guns” such as rifles and shotguns.46  The Brady Act’s requirement for 
background checks left significant gaps in the regulation of firearms 
transfers based on its interaction with previous federal statutes and is a major 
reason why universal background checks are not a federal requirement to this 
 
 38   Gray, supra note 19. 
 39   Gray, supra note 19. 
 40   Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 541–42. 
 41   Luff, supra note 14, at 1589 (“According to one scholar, it was ‘this generation’s most 
important federal gun control law . . . and, at the moment of its passage, [was] praised . . . as 
a major turning point in the politics of gun control and crime control.’ Another scholar 
observed, however, that the limitations of the Brady Act were actually modest. . .”). 
 42   Luff, supra note 14, at 1589. 
 43   Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 542. 
 44   Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 542. 
 45   Luff, supra note 14, at 1589. 
 46   Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 542.  
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day.47 
Gun rights advocates recognized that 20th century legislation had laid 
a foundation for more powerful firearm regulation in the future and turned 
their focus to the courts to challenge the power of the federal government to 
implement this legislation. 
B. How Jurisprudence Has Simultaneously Strengthened and Limited 
Congressional Authority to Regulate Firearms. 
Traditionally, Congress relies on its broad regulatory powers under the 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution to regulate the transfer and 
possession of firearms.48  In some instances Congress has also regulated 
manufacturing, importing, and dealing of firearms under their tax powers, as 
demonstrated by the NFA, but generally modern statutes fall under the power 
to regulate interstate commerce.49  Gun rights advocates primarily challenge 
the authority of Congress to regulate the transfer and possession of firearms 
on three grounds: (1) that Congress is exceeding the authority granted by the 
Commerce Clause,50 (2) that Congress is regulating activity reserved to the 
States in violation of the Tenth Amendment,51 or (3) that Congress’ 
regulations violate the protections of the Second Amendment and the 
people’s right to bear arms.52  The following cases demonstrate how the 
Court’s rulings on these challenges have both limited and solidified 
congressional authority to regulate firearms possession and transfer. 
1. Limits on Congressional Power to Enact Gun Control 
Regulations after Lopez and Printz. 
Prior to 1995 congressional authority to regulate firearms under the 
Commerce Clause had been essentially unchallenged.53  In 1990, Congress 
 
 47   See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 48   VIVIAN CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43033, CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO 
REGULATE FIREARMS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2013) (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
Regulate Commerce with foreign Nationals, and among the several states, and with Indian 
Tribes.”) (citing U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 1).  
 49   Id. at 1 n.8 (“The National Firearms Act of 1934 levies taxes regarding the 
manufacture and transfer of certain firearms and other weapons. Therefore, it could be argued 
that Congress is also relying on its authority under the Taxing Clause to enact this statute. 
U.S. Const., art. I, §8, cl. 1.”). 
 50   Id. at 4.  See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 51   Chu, supra note 48, at 5.  See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 52   Chu, supra note 48, at 5.  See also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
 53   Kathleen M. Sullivan & Noah Feldman, Constitutional Law 142 (Robert C. Clark et 
al. eds., 19th ed. 2016) (“For Nearly 60 years after the New Deal, the Court did not strike 
down a single federal statute as exceeding Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. . . 
In 1995, a decision invalidating a congressional gun control law broke that longstanding 
record.”). 
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passed legislation making it a “federal offense ‘for any individual knowingly 
to possess a firearm at a place the individual knows, or has reasonable cause 
to believe, is a school zone.’”54  Following the arrest of a San Antonio high 
school student under this provision, a challenge to the law made its way to 
the Supreme Court in 1995.55  Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion 
of the Court holding that Congress had exceeded its authority by enacting 
the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 (“Gun Control Act”).56  Justice 
Rehnquist began by describing three categories of activity which the Court 
has interpreted congressional authority to regulate in accordance with the 
commerce power.57  The Court stated that Congress has the authority to 
regulate “the use of the channels of interstate commerce,” “the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate 
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities,” 
and “those activities having substantial relation to interstate commerce.”58  
With the framework for testing the Gun Control Act established, the Court 
quickly determined that to pass muster, the Act would have to regulate 
activity which “substantially affects” interstate commerce in accordance 
with the third category.59  Ultimately, the Court held that the mere possession 
of a firearm within a school zone, could not be said to substantially affect 
interstate commerce without an attenuated chain of events too far removed 
to justify upholding the statute.60  Some saw this case as a significant 
limitation of Congress’ ability to regulate the firearms in intrastate activities 
 
 54   Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994)).  
 55   See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 56   Chu, supra note 48, at 2.  
 57   Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59. 
 58   Id. at 559. (The Court went on to discuss the third kind of activity at length asking, 
“whether an activity must ‘affect’ or ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce in order to be 
within Congress’ power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause.” Ultimately the Court held 
that based on the weight of precedent, the proper test is to determine whether the activity in 
question “substantially affects” interstate commerce). 
 59   Id. at 559; Chu, supra note 48, at 2-3 (“Under the first two categories, Lopez endorses 
Congress’s ‘power to regulate all activities, persons or products that cross state boundaries. 
So long as a federal regulation relates to interstate transactions or interstate transportation, the 
federal regulation would be justified under the first two branchesFalse’ However, in 
examining the School Zones Act, the Court concluded that possession of a gun in a school 
zone was neither a regulation of the channels nor the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce.”). Notably, the Court did discuss that the analysis might be different if there was 
a jurisdictional element to the law, stating that a jurisdictional element might “limit [the 
statute’s] reach to a discrete set of firearms possessions that additionally have an explicit 
connection with or effect on interstate commerce.” Chu, supra note 48 at 3 n.24 (quoting 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562). 
 60   Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (“To uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would 
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the 
States.”).  
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as a whole.  Nonetheless, significantly for the future of firearm regulation, 
while the Court found that Congress had exceeded their authority in Lopez, 
a subsequent case has clarified the requirements of the “substantially affects” 
doctrine.61 
In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court held that “Congress can regulate purely 
intrastate activity that is not itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced for 
sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would 
undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.”62  This 
language supports upholding a congressional regulation of firearms transfers 
without requiring actual evidence that the activities substantially affect 
interstate commerce or undercut a larger regulatory scheme, so long as there 
is a rational basis for Congress to make such conclusions.63  Subsequent 
challenges to firearm regulation under the Commerce Clause have attempted 
to undermine the ruling in Gonzales v. Raich as it applies to intrastate firearm 
manufacturing and transfer under state law.64  Ultimately, the holding in 
Gonzales v. Raich has withstood such challenges on the basis that 
congressional regulations of intrastate manufacture and sale of firearms is 
necessary to enable the successful implementation of any federal scheme of 
firearm regulation.65  Similarly, in cases of intrastate “non-commercial” 
transfer of firearms federal courts have held that, similar to the marijuana in 
Raich, failure to regulate this “non-commercial” activity would interfere 
with the larger regulatory framework.66 
 
 61   Chu, supra note 48, at 4 n.28 (“[T]he Court in Gonzales v. Raich subsequently 
clarified that Congress still has considerable authority under the ‘substantially affects’ 
doctrine to regulate activity that is ‘quintessentially economic’ on the intrastate level, even 
though the activity itself is not a part of interstate commerce.”) (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005). 
 62   Chu, supra note 48, at 4.  
 63   Chu, supra note 48, at 4.  
 64   See Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 978 (2013) (“[Plaintiff] 
wants to manufacture firearms under the Montana Firearms Freedom Act, state legislation 
that declares that the manufacture and sale of certain firearms within the state is beyond the 
scope of Congress’s commerce power.”).  
 65   Chu, supra note 48, at 9 (“In upholding the validity of the National Firearms Act and 
Gun Control Act as applied to the intrastate manufacture and sale of firearms and firearms 
accessories, the district court stated that Congress had a rational basis, without the need to 
have particularized findings, to conclude that failure to regulate intrastate manufacture and 
sale of firearms would leave a ‘gaping hole’ in the federal scheme regulating firearms.”) 
(quoting Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104301, at *1 (D. 
Mont. Aug. 31, 2010)).  
 66   Chu, supra note 48, at 13 (“The Sixth Circuit stated that guns, similar to marijuana, 
are a ‘fungible commodity’ for which there is an established interstate market and that the 
provision at issue is a part of the larger regulatory framework. The court concluded that the 
relevant ‘legislative history supports the logical connection between the intrastate sale and 
disposition of firearms and interstate market in firearms.’”) (quoting United States v. Rose, 
522 F.3d 710, 718–19 (6th Cir. 2008)). 
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Another limitation on congressional ability to regulate firearms 
transaction comes from the Tenth Amendment, and the anti-commandeering 
principle announced in New York v. United States.67  As previously 
discussed, the interim provisions of the Brady Act required CLEOs to 
conduct background checks on persons wishing to purchase a firearm from 
an FFL to determine if that person was a prohibited purchaser.68  In Printz v. 
United States, a Montana CLEO challenged the constitutionality of the 
Brady Act’s requirement, arguing that the provision was unconstitutional 
under the Tenth Amendment.69  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, agreed 
with the petitioners and held that the requirement for CLEOs to enforce the 
provisions of the Brady Act was clearly a violation of the rule set forth in 
New York, and that the provisions of the Brady Act were therefore 
unconstitutional.70  While Printz invalidated the interim provision, the ruling 
significantly did not address any issues with the congressional regulation of 
firearms under the Commerce Clause.71  Justice O’Connor went beyond this, 
specifically distinguishing in her concurrence that “[t]he Brady Act violates 
the Tenth Amendment to the extent it forces States and local law enforcement 
officers to perform background checks on prospective handgun owners and 
to accept Brady Forms from firearms dealers.  Our holding, of course, does 
not spell the end of the objectives of the Brady Act.”72  Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence seems to indicate that a federally enforced regulatory system in 
which state and local governments can voluntarily participate would be 
 
 67   Sullivan & Feldman, supra note 53 at 182 (discussing the extension of the anti-
commandeering principle, preventing the federal government from forcing states to enact 
legislation, to apply to federal laws directing state and local executive officials to enforce 
federal legislation).  
 68   Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26 at 542; See discussion, supra Section II.A.3.  
 69   Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904 (1997).  
 70   Id. at 933 (“We adhere to that principle today, and conclude categorically, as we 
concluded categorically in New York: ‘The Federal Government may not compel the States to 
enact or administer a federal regulatory program.’ The mandatory obligation imposed on 
CLEOs to perform background checks on prospective handgun purchasers plainly runs afoul 
of that rule.”) (quoting United States v. New York, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)).  
 71   See generally id.  
 72   Printz, 521 U.S. at 935–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). But c.f. Printz, 521 U.S. at 937 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In my ‘revisionist’ view, 
the Federal Government’s authority under the Commerce Clause . . . does not extend to the 
regulation of wholly intrastate, point-of-sale transactions. Absent the underlying authority to 
regulate the intrastate transfer of firearms, Congress surely lacks the corollary power to 
impress state law enforcement officers into administering and enforcing such regulations. 
Although this Court has long interpreted the Constitution as ceding Congress extensive 
authority to regulate commerce (interstate or otherwise), I continue to believe that we must 
‘temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence’ and return to an interpretation better rooted in 
the Clause’s original understanding. Even if we construe Congress’ authority to regulate 
interstate commerce to encompass those intrastate transactions that ‘substantially affect’ 
interstate commerce, I question whether Congress can regulate the particular transactions at 
issue here.”) (internal citations omitted).  
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constitutional under the Commerce Clause.73 
Ultimately, while both Lopez and Printz were seen as wins for the pro-
gun rights lobby, limiting federal power to regulate firearms possession and 
transfer, the holding in each case did very little to prevent congressional 
power to regulate under the authority of the Commerce Clause. 
2. How Individual Rights and Federal Gun Control apply Post-
Heller/McDonald. 
The other primary challenge to any federal regulation of firearms 
typically manifests as a challenge based on individual right to bear arms as 
protected by the Second Amendment.74  Traditionally, this right to bear arms 
was understood to bear relation to some association or affiliation with 
contributing to the common defense in a militia.75  In 2008, the Supreme 
Court essentially reversed seventy years of precedent in deciding District of 
Columbia v. Heller.76 
The petitioners in Heller challenged a thirty-two year-old handgun ban 
in Washington, D.C. on the basis that the statute violated the Second 
Amendment.77  The statute in Heller banned, among other things, the 
possession, registration, and carry of handguns as well as requiring all 
handguns to be locked and unloaded even when in a private citizen’s home.78  
The Heller Court, analyzed the language of the Second Amendment based 
 
 73   Id. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“States and chief law enforcement officers may 
voluntarily continue to participate in the federal program.”); See Chu, supra note 48 at 5. 
 74   U.S. CONST., amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of 
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). 
 75   United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (“In the absence of any evidence 
tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen 
inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency 
of a well-regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to 
keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly, it is not within judicial notice that this weapon 
is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common 
defense.”) (citation omitted).  In Miller, the Court evaluated a claim that the defendants were 
entitled to carry sawed-off shotguns under the protection of the Second Amendment. After 
evaluating the text of the Second Amendment the Court determined that this type of weapon 
was not protected as it served no real militia function, and its possession was not attributable 
to supporting the common defense.  
 76   Gray, supra note 19.  
 77   District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574 (2008).  
 78   Id. at 574–75 (“The District of Columbia generally prohibits the possession of 
handguns. It is a crime to carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns is 
prohibited. Wholly apart from that prohibition, no person may carry a handgun without a 
license, but the chief of police may issue licenses for 1-year periods. District of Columbia law 
also requires residents to keep their lawfully owned firearms, such as registered long guns, 
‘unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device’ unless they are located 
in a place of business or are being used for lawful recreational activities.”) (internal citations 
omitted).  
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on its two clauses, ultimately finding that the text of the Amendment coupled 
with the historical context guarantees an individual right to possess arms.79  
The majority, written by Justice Scalia, argued that the statute at issue would 
fail any level of scrutiny.80  Despite not naming any specific level of scrutiny 
with which the Court or lower courts should use regarding Second 
Amendment challenges in the future, the opinion seems to suggest that a 
heightened level of scrutiny is most appropriate.81  Justice Breyer, in his 
dissent, contended exactly the opposite, arguing that even if the Second 
Amendment applies—which he expresses doubts that it does—the District 
of Columbia’s ordinance would survive the proper degree of scrutiny based 
on a balancing of competing interests.82 
While the decision in Heller was widely heralded as a major victory for 
gun rights advocates, it does not severely limit the federal government’s 
ability to regulate the transfer of firearms.83  Justice Scalia acknowledged 
that the Second Amendment, similar to other rights, is not unlimited.84  He 
then discussed a non-exhaustive list of current constitutionally valid 
prohibitions and restrictions regarding the possession and transfer of 
firearms, specifically identifying laws “imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”85 
In 2010, the protections of Heller were extended to the states, 
incorporated under the concept of due process.86  Since Heller was decided 
in Washington, D.C. the Second Amendment was applied under federal law, 
but the petitioners in McDonald v. City of Chicago argued that the ruling was 
 
 79   Sullivan, supra note 53 at 471.  
 80   LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Summary and Analysis of District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 2 (July 2008), https://lawcenter.giffords.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/dc_v_heller_analysis.pdf.  
 81   Id. at 2 (“The majority opinion states that the handgun ban would fail any standard of 
scrutiny . . . but does not articulate a standard that should be applied in evaluating other laws 
under the Second Amendment.”) (citation omitted). 
 82   Sullivan, supra note 53, at 472 (“Under an appropriate balancing of interests, ‘which 
focuses upon the presence of handguns in high-crime urban areas . . . [the D.C. ordinance] 
represents a permissible legislative response to a serious, indeed life-threatening problem,’ 
and is ‘tailored to’ that problem . . . “). 
 83   Sullivan, supra note 53, at 471.  
 84   Sullivan, supra note 53, at 471 (“[R]easonable restrictions on firearm ownership could 
still be constitutional: ‘Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not 
unlimited.”). 
 85   Sullivan & Feldman, supra note 53, at 471 (“Although we not undertake an exhaustive 
historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion 
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms ins sensitive places 
such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on 
the commercial sale of arms.”) (emphasis added).  
 86   McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010).  
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not applicable as the Second Amendment has no application to the states.87  
Similar to the D.C. law, a Chicago ordinance effectively banned possession 
of handguns by private citizens who resided in the city.88  In the majority 
opinion, Justice Alito confirmed the holding in Heller, and held that based 
on the fundamental nature of the Second Amendment and its deep roots in 
the “nation’s history and tradition,” the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated the Second Amendment protections announced in 
Heller to the States.89  The city relied on arguments Justice Breyer had made 
in his Heller dissent, but the Court held that an interest balancing test was 
not appropriate despite failing to identify a specific level of judicial scrutiny 
for Second Amendment cases.90  More importantly for the development of 
future gun control regulation, the opinion also reaffirmed the 
constitutionality of longstanding prohibitions on possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, as well as laws conditioning or qualifying 
commercial sales of arms.91 
Ultimately, while Heller and McDonald were seen as overwhelming 
victories for the pro-gun-rights lobby, placing restrictions on state and 
federal authority to prohibit firearm possession and transfer, these cases also 
solidified Congress’ constitutional authority to regulate the commercial 
transfer of firearms.  While challenges to firearms regulation will 
undoubtedly continue, the holdings in Lopez, Printz, Heller, and McDonald 
have certainly not prevented future development and implementation of a 
federal system to regulate the transfer of firearms. 
III. CURRENT BACKGROUND CHECK GAPS AND LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, 
AND STATE-BASED ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS THEM. 
As is evident from the historical construction of gun control in the 
United States, the current system regulating the commercial and non-
commercial transfer of firearms was not created with a single comprehensive 
vision, but rather, has been pieced together over time.  These incremental 
changes and patchwork attempts at regulation are what have led to the 
current gaps that plague federal legislation today.  Recent attempts by the 
 
 87   Id. at 750. 
 88   Id.  
 89   Sullivan & Feldman, supra note 53, at 473-75.  
 90   McDonald, 561 U.S. at 785–86. 
 91   Id. (“We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such 
longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and 
the mentally ill,’ ‘laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools 
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial 
sale of arms.’ We repeat those assurances here. Despite municipal respondents’ doomsday 
proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”) (internal 
citations omitted).  
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Legislative and Executive branches to remedy these gaps have been 
unsuccessful, as the country remains divided on how to approach these 
issues.92  In the face of federal failure, states have chosen how to regulate 
firearms in varied ways with similarly varied results.93  Some scholars argue 
that national remedies may be unattainable until state level regulation 
determines approaches capable of obtaining nationwide support.94  It is 
therefore appropriate to compare federal and state based attempts to regulate 
the implementation of background checks in the transfer of firearms to get 
an idea of what may be successful in the future.  First, this section will look 
at the current gap in background check requirements created by statutory and 
regulatory language.  After identifying the critical gap, the analysis will turn 
to legislative, executive, and finally state-based attempts to address the hole 
in background check requirements. 
A. Statutory Gaps and Recent Legislative Attempts to Fix Them. 
As was evident in Heller, some longstanding prohibitions on possession 
and transfer of firearms are widely accepted as fundamental to regulation of 
gun control.95  The GCA identifies nine classes of persons prohibited from 
purchasing or possessing a firearm.96  The central mechanism to implement 
those prohibitions, and what gives the law teeth, is the concept of universal 
background checks.97  Unfortunately, based on the current construction of 
federal laws, background checks are not required in all firearm transactions 
or transfers.98  As previously discussed, the GCA requires that all persons 
engaging in the business of manufacturing, distributing or dealing firearms 
to obtain an FFL.99  Additionally, the Brady Act requires all FFLs to conduct 
a background check through NICS on the recipient when transferring a 
firearm.100  FOPA limited the definition of “engaged in the business” to 
exclude those sellers who merely transfer firearms occasionally or as a 
 
 92   Rostron, supra note 17, at 328.  
 93   Rostron, supra note 17, at 328 (“While the gun issue has been stalled at the federal 
level, some state legislatures have been more activeFalse [T]he nation continues to become 
more fractures on [gun issues], with variation in state approaches to guns becoming even more 
prominent than in the past.”).  See discussion infra Part III(B). 
 94   Rostron, supra note 17, at 329.  
 95   District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008). 
 96   18 U.S.C.S. § 922(g). See Rostron, supra note 17, at 341 (“Federal laws disqualify 
some people from having guns, such as convicted felons, fugitives, drug addicts, illegal aliens, 
people with misdemeanor convictions for domestic violence or subject to domestic violence 
restraining orders, and people who have been committed to a mental institution or determined 
through court adjudication to have serious mental impairments.”).  
 97   Rostron, supra note 17, at 340–41.  
 98   Rostron supra note 17, at 341.  
 99   18 U.S.C.S. § 923(a).  
 100   18 U.S.C.S. § 922(t). 
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hobby.101  This limitation allows for a person who is legally prohibited from 
purchasing or owning a firearm to obtain one by purchasing from a seller 
who is not obligated to conduct a background check.102  While it is still illegal 
for the seller to transfer a weapon to a prohibited person, the statute requires 
that the seller “knowingly” transfers the firearm to a prohibited party, 
incentivizing private sellers to not ask questions or conduct background 
checks when making a transfer.103  However, when background checks are 
conducted, research shows that they prevent a significant number of 
prohibited persons from purchasing and possessing firearms.104 
Based on research and studies indicating the benefits of background 
checks, the federal government has attempted through legislative and 
executive powers to address the regulatory gap.  In 1994, gun control 
advocates looked to build upon the gains made by the Brady Act and 
introduced the Gun Violence Protection Act of 1994 (“Brady II”).105  Brady 
II attempted to close the gap by making it illegal for any individual to transfer 
a handgun to an individual that is not an FFL, or does not have a state issued 
handgun license.106  Similarly in 1999, the Gun Show Accountability Act 
attempted to extend the background check requirement to transactions where 
any part of the transaction occurs at a gun show or is initiated at a gun show 
and occurs at a different time and location.107  In 2013, Congress once again 
sought to reduce the “gun show loophole” through the creation of the 
Manchin-Toomey Amendment.108  Even if the bill had passed and become 
law, the Manchin-Toomey Amendment alterations were detrimentally 
under-inclusive and would not have sufficiently closed the gap for all private 
sales as they merely restricted the transfer of firearms at gun shows.109  All 
three of these legislative efforts failed to garner sufficient support in 
Congress to be submitted to the President and therefore none ever became 
 
 101   18 U.S.C § 921(a) (21); Luff, supra note 14, at 1588–89. 
 102   Rostron supra note 17, at 341. 
 103   18 U.S.C. § 922(t). 
 104   Andrew McClurg, In Search of the Golden Mean in the Gun Debate, 58 HOW. L.J. 
779, 790-91 (2015) (Stating that despite regulatory gaps, and system imperfections, 
background checks can still be effective, “A Justice Department report estimated that between 
1994 (when background checks went into effect) and 2010, background checks prevented 
more than 2.1 million prohibited purchasers from obtaining guns from licensed dealers.”) 
(emphasis added).  
 105   Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 545. 
 106   Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 545 (citing Gun Violence Prevention Act of 1994, 
S. 1878, 103d Cong. (1994); Gun Violence Prevention Act of 1994, H. 3932, 103d Cong. 
(1994)). 
 107   Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 546 (citing Gun Show Accountability Act, S. 443, 
106th Cong. § 931(c)(1) (1999)). 
 108   Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 546.  
 109   Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 546–548.  
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B. Executive Approaches to Gun Control. 
Following the San Bernardino Massacre in 2015, President Barack 
Obama grew tired of Congress’ inaction on gun control initiatives and 
attempted to implement some of his own through a series of executive 
orders.111  While there was significant opposition from gun rights activists 
and lobbying organizations like the NRA, the executive actions really did 
little to affect the way regulation of firearm transfers occurred.112  The 
executive orders essentially reiterated enforcement guidance for the ATF to 
employ when determining whether someone is engaged in the business of 
selling firearms.113  The agency guidance did not alter enforcement of the 
existing law, it did not require more firearm sellers to obtain FFLs, and really 
only served to clarify what quantity and frequency of sales indicate whether 
or not someone is engaged in the business of selling firearms.114  Prior to 
leaving office, President Obama also attempted to strengthen existing 
background check systems through an executive order requiring the Social 
Security Administration to send NICS records of mentally disabled people 
for use in the background check database.115 
When President Trump took office in 2017, he made good on campaign 
promises to roll back the gun control efforts of the Obama Administration.116  
President Trump not only blocked the Social Security Administration order, 
weakened the NICS system, but also had the Justice Department narrow its 
definition of fugitives who are prohibited from purchasing weapons.117  After 
the Parkland School Shooting in 2018, President Trump surprised many by 
showing support for initiatives to strengthen background checks.118  Since 
 
 110   Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 546–51.  
 111   Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 555 (citing Press Release, White House Office of 
the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: New Executive Actions to Reduce Gun Violence and Make Our 
Communities Safer (Jan. 4, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/01/04/fact-sheet-new-executive-actions-reduce-gun-violence-and-make-our).   
 112   Rostron, supra note 17, at 336–37.  
 113   Rostron, supra note 17, at 336–37 
 114   Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 556–57. 
 115   Gregory Korte, “Trump Signs Bill Reversing Obama Rule to Ban Gun Purchases by 
Mentally Ill,” USA TODAY, Feb. 28, 2017, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/28/trump-sign-bill-blocking-obama-
gun-rule/98484106/.  
 116   Beth Reinhard & Sari Horwitz, “The Trump Administration Has Already Been 
Rolling Back Gun Regulations,” THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 4, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/the-trump-administration-has-already-been-
rolling-back-gun-regulations/2017/10/04/5eaad7d6-a86b-11e7-8ed2-
c7114e6ac460_story.html?utm_term=.5e8fa398f186. 
 117   Id. 
 118   Tessa Berenson, “Here’s Where President Trump Stands on 5 Gun Control Ideas” 
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that time President Trump has retreated on this position, taking stances that 
mirror those of the Republican Party and the NRA on the issue of 
background checks, most recently promising to veto the Bipartisan 
Background Checks Act of 2019 should it pass in both houses of Congress.119  
Ultimately, the actions of the executive branch in recent history has done 
little to improve the effectiveness of gun control through background checks. 
C. Comparative Analysis of State Based Approaches to Background 
Checks. 
As federal attempts to strengthen background check requirements for 
firearm transfers have come up short, many states have decided to 
supplement the baseline federal requirements.  States have employed a 
variety of methods to help strengthen regulation of firearm purchase and 
possession with similarly varied results.120  Below is a comparison of three 
states with different approaches to regulation: (1) Missouri, (2) Connecticut, 
and (3) California.  Missouri does not supplement federal regulation, while 
the latter two states have supplemented federal background check 
requirements in different ways with different levels of effectiveness. 
1. Missouri. 
Missouri is rated forty-sixth in terms of state gun law strength.121  
Missouri is an interesting case study because the state is a prime example of 
why permit to purchase, or universal background checks, are so effective.  
Permit to Purchase (“PTP”) regulations require firearm purchasers to obtain 
a license confirming they have already passed necessary background check 
procedures under federal and state requirements before they are able to 
finalize a firearm transaction.122  In 2007 Missouri repealed their permit to 
purchase requirement, and since that time have seen the number of firearms-
related homicides increased approximately twenty-five percent.123  
Following the repeal of the almost ninety-year-old law, Missouri also saw a 
 
TIME (Mar. 12, 2018), http://time.com/5195469/donald-trump-gun-control-white-house/. 
 119   Jacob Pramuk, House Passes Another Bill to Strengthen Gun Background Checks as 
Trump Pledges to Veto, CNBC (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/28/house-
passes-gun-control-background-check-bill-trump-pledges-to-veto.html. 
 120   See McClurg, supra note 104, at 790–93; Rostron, supra note 17, at 341–43; Jacobs 
& Fuhr, supra note 26, at 564–66.  
 121   Gifford’s Law Center, Annual Gun Law Scorecard 50 State Rankings 2018, 
http://lawcenter.giffords.org/scorecard/#rankings (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
 122   Daniel Webster, et. al., Effects of the Repeal of Missouri’s Handgun Purchaser 
Licensing Law on Homicides, 91 J. OF URBAN HEALTH 293, 294 (2014). 
 123   Id. at 296 (In 2008, at the first full year after the permit-to-purchase licensing law was 
repealed, the firearm homicide rate in Missouri increased sharply to 6.23 per 100,000, a 34 % 
increase from the baseline mean. For the post-repeal period of 2008–2010, the mean annual 
firearm homicide rate was 5.82, 24.9 % higher than the pre-repeal mean. . .”).  
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sharp increase in the number of crime guns that originated from in-state 
retailers.124  Following the repeal of the PTP laws, Missouri also saw its 
firearm suicide rates raise by sixteen percent.125  Missouri now has the third 
highest gun death rate per one hundred thousand people in the country at 
21.3 deaths per one hundred thousand people.126  Following the repeal, the 
state does not require background checks prior to the transfer of firearms 
between private unlicensed parties.127  This has led to Missouri being in the 
top half of states in crime gun exports, meaning that guns purchased in 
Missouri were used and recovered following crimes in other states.128  The 
researchers felt confident that “the study provides compelling confirmation 
that weakness in firearm laws lead to death from gun violence.”129  While 
Missouri provides a compelling study into the effects removing background 
checks can have on gun violence, Connecticut makes a similarly compelling 
display of the positive effects more restrictive requirements can have. 
2. Connecticut. 
In 1995, Connecticut enacted a law supplementing federal requirements 
for background checks by requiring all handgun purchasers to obtain a 
permit from local police and mandating a minimum of eight hours safety 
training.130  Conducting a statistical analysis to estimate the effect of the PTP 
laws on Connecticut’s homicide and suicide rates, researchers found a 
reduction in both the state’s homicide and suicide rates.131  Multiple studies 
showed that the PTP laws reduced the overall level of lethal gun violence as 
the firearm related homicide rate dropped by nearly forty percent,132 and the 
firearm related suicide rate dropped nearly fifteen percent. 
Following the tragedy at Sandy Hook, the Connecticut legislature 
continued to bolster the regulations on firearms in 2013, making background 
 
 124   Id. at 294 (“Webster and colleagues reported that immediately following the repeal of 
Missouri’s PTP handgun law, there was a twofold increase in the percentage of guns that had 
unusually short intervals between the retail sale and the recovery by police, an indicator of 
firearm diversion or trafficking. The repeal also coincided with a sharp increase in the 
percentage of crime guns recovered by police in Missouri that had been originally sold by in-
state retailers, from 56.4 % in 2006 to 71.8 % in 2012.”).  
 125   Cassandra Crifasi, et. al., Effects of Changes in Permit-to-Purchase Handgun Laws 
in Connecticut and Missouri on Suicide Rates, 79 PREVENTATIVE MEDICINE 43, 47 (2015).  
 126   Gifford’s Law Center, Annual Gun Law Scorecard 50 State Rankings 2018, 
http://lawcenter.giffords.org/scorecard/#rankings (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
 127   Gifford’s Law Center, Missouri State Gun Laws, http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-
laws/state-law/Missouri/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
 128   Id.  
 129   Chokshi, supra note 18.  
 130   Rostron, supra note 17 at 347.  
 131   Kara Rudolph, et. al., Association Between Connecticut’s Permit-to-Purchase 
Handgun Law and Homicides, 105 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH e49, e51-53 (2015). 
 132   See id.; see also Crifasi, supra note 125, at 47. 
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checks necessary for all types of firearms, not only handguns, as well as 
ammunition.133  The Executive Director of Connecticut Against Gun 
Violence cites these changes as leading to one of the lowest years of gun 
violence in the state’s history.134  He reported that gun-related homicides in 
the state had reduced significantly following implementation of the 
additional background checks, referencing that the state previously had, on 
average, about ninety-two gun-related homicides per year compared to only 
fifty-three in 2016.135 
3. California. 
California has supplemented federal gun control legislation by 
requiring a background check for all gun sales at the point of transfer.136  
Since 1991, California has required all persons not in the business of selling 
firearms to transfer through an intermediary when conducting a transaction 
with an un-licensed individual.137  Gifford’s Law Center to Prevent Gun 
Violence rates California as the number one state in terms of gun law 
strength.138  They possess one of the lowest gun-related death rate per one 
hundred thousand people at 7.45, the seventh lowest gun related death rate 
in the country, placing behind only other states who also supplement federal 
background check requirements.139  California also has the fifth lowest rate 
of guns exported to other states which are used to commit crimes.140  Despite 
California’s efforts to reduce gun violence through supplemental laws, its 
efforts may be undercut if prohibited persons unable to acquire firearms in 
California can access firearms in Nevada or Arizona where laws are not as 
 
 133   Lori Mack, What’s Been the Impact of Connecticut’s Gun Laws After Sandy Hook?, 
WNPR NEWS (Dec. 8, 2017), http://www.wnpr.org/post/whats-been-impact-connecticuts-
gun-laws-after-sandy-hook.  
 134   Id.  
 135   Id.  
 136   Rostron, supra note 17, at 341–42. 
 137   Rostron, supra note 17, at 341 (“The process essentially involves using a licensed gun 
dealer as an intermediary between the owner of the gun and the person seeking to buy it. The 
owner takes the gun to a licensed dealer, and the dealer runs a background check on the 
prospective purchaser. If the purchaser passes the background check, the purchaser gets the 
gun. If not, the dealer returns the gun to the owner.”).  
 138   Gifford’s Law Center, Annual Gun Law Scorecard 50 State Rankings 2017, 
http://lawcenter.giffords.org/scorecard/#rankings (last visited Apr. 10, 2020). 
 139   Id.; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Firearm Mortality by State, 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/firearm_mortality/firearm.htm (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2020). 
 140   Gifford’s Law Center, California State Gun Laws, http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-
laws/state-law/California/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives, ATF Firearms Trace Data Report, 
https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/undefined/2016tracestatscaliforniapdf/download (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2020).  
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The success of California’s current gun control measures has enabled 
the state to continue developing the regulations that they hope will reduce 
gun violence in the future.142  Some of these measures include expanded bans 
on purchase, possession, and ownership of firearms by those afflicted with 
mental disorders or those with previous domestic violence convictions.143  
While gun rights advocates have contested the effect of these proposals on 
violence in the Golden State, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence 
maintains that these laws continue to save lives.144 
It is evident from the state-based analysis that supplemental 
requirements for background checks have a significant impact on lethal 
violence inflicted with firearms.145  While current federal laws struggle to 
address the ability of prohibited purchasers from acquiring firearms, 
examples provided by states continue to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
minimum background check standards.  In his New State Ice dissent, Justice 
Brandeis opined that variation in state laws provide a valuable opportunity 
for experimentation in policy, effectively serving as a source of trial and 
error to determine both successful and unsuccessful policies.146  While states 
can serve as an effective laboratory for testing the validity of various gun 
control measures, this analysis would suggest that universal background 
checks have already passed the initial viability test and should be 
implemented at the federal level.  Even though the impact of states making 
poor choices regarding policy may be better than a national implementation 
of faulty regulation, the impact will nevertheless be harmful to those 
affected.147  In the area of gun control the harm to those affected is 
significant, and therefore it is time to move past state testing and implement 
a federal requirement that all firearms transfers require background checks. 
IV. PROPOSAL TO ADOPT A FEDERAL MINIMUM UNIVERSAL BACKGROUND 
CHECK REQUIREMENT. 
Perfect is the enemy of good when it comes to gun control legislation, 
and a small change in background check requirements that can be 
implemented now should be the short-term goal.  Making a small, measured 
 
 141   Rostron, supra note 17, at 357–58. 
 142   Jeff Daniels, “Stricter Gun Laws in 2019 — Including California Lifetime Firearms 
Ownership Ban on Some Domestic Abusers”, CNBC (Dec. 7, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/26/tougher-gun-laws-to-take-effect-in-2019-in-ca-several-
other-states.html.  
 143   Id.  
 144   Id. 
 145   See supra Section III(c).  
 146   Rostron, supra note 17, at 357–58. 
 147   Rostron, supra note 17, at 356. 
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change to federal regulation of firearms will not prevent more state-based 
analysis to continue on what subsequent measures should be taken to reduce 
gun violence.  But rather than wait while the damage continues to amass, the 
best approach is to enact a minimum federal requirement for universal 
background checks at the point of any firearm transfer similar to the 
California approach.  As previously mentioned, government and the public 
widely support universal background checks.148  The impacts of requiring 
background checks in various forms is evident based on the disparity in 
firearm-based violence amongst states with and without supplemental 
procedures.149  In Missouri, a House Resolution imposed numerous 
restrictions and measures intended to deter would-be purchasers of 
firearms.150  The failure of this bill shows how an over-inclusive approach to 
gun control legislation limits the possibility that an effective law will actually 
pass.  While many of these provisions may be worth considering, it is better 
to utilize the state laboratory approach to evaluate more controversial 
requirements once universal background checks are already in effect at the 
federal level. 
Another pitfall to avoid in creating a minimum standard is being under-
inclusive.  Similar to the Manchin-Toomey Amendment, legislators must be 
wary of closing small gaps such as the “gun show loophole” while leaving 
all other private transactions unregulated.151  The recent proposal of House 
Resolution 8 (H.R. 8), or the Bipartisan Background Checks Act of 2019, is 
the closest legislation has come to achieving the kind of change that this 
analysis believes will create a small but significant first step towards future 
change.152  H.R. 8 requires all unlicensed firearms dealers to transfer firearms 
through an FFL holder implementing the current background check 
requirements for FFLs to be enforced on all transfers.153  By keeping this bill 
limited to background checks, gun control advocates are hopeful that the bill 
will pass through Congress, despite facing an uphill battle in the Republican 
controlled Senate.154  While opposition from conservative gun rights 
lobbyists is significant, this kind of change can initiate a movement for larger 
 
 148   Miller, supra note 12.  
 149   See Discussion, supra Section III.C. 
 150   H.B. 366, 99th Gen. Assemb., First Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017). In addition to background 
checks, the bill would have required purchasers to watch a thirty-minute video on firearm 
injuries, tour an emergency trauma center when gun violence victims are present, meet with 
families of gun violence victims, and other deterrent based measures all prior to receiving a 
firearm. 
 151   Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 546-548. 
 152   Sheryl Stolberg, “Background Check Bill Marks Gun Control as a Priority for House 
Democrats”, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019) 
(https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/us/politics/house-democrats-gun-control.html). 
 153   Id.  
 154   Id.  
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overhaul in gun control.155  In February 2019, H.R. 8 passed through the 
House of Representative and was co-sponsored by 5 Republican members.  
While a positive step, the vote was primarily along party lines and President 
Trump already indicated he would veto the bill if it eventually passes through 
the Senate.156 
While this “solution” will not solve all of the gun violence issues in the 
United States, it will be the first step to addressing other significant 
challenges.  Having mandatory background checks in place will enable 
legislators to examine how those systems can be further improved through 
methods such as enhancing the accuracy and speed of NICS,157 
implementing waiting periods,158 and assessing other holes in the 
background check system like the “Charleston Loophole”.159  Universal 
background checks are not the cure; instead, a minimally invasive, 
marginally controversial remedy is needed to begin tackling one of the 
nation’s most critical issues. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
The requirement for universal background checks will by no means 
solve all of the problems in the weapons transfer universe.  As evidenced by 
history, gun control legislation will slowly be pieced together over time but 
implementing this kind of federal uniformity can at least begin refurbishing 
a broken system.  Critics of this kind of minimum universal background 
check requirement will continue to argue that many of the mass shootings 
and murders in recent memory would not have been prevented by a 
background check.160  The only argument that needs furnishing in return is: 
what about the one that could have prevented.  President Obama passionately 
championed this message in the days after the Sandy Hook shooting, 
pleading with the nation and the government for even incremental change by 
stating the complexity of the problem is no longer tolerable as an excuse for 
 
 155   See Id. 
 156   Brakkton Booker, “House Passes Sweeping Gun Bill,” NPR (Feb. 27, 2019, 3:46 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/02/27/698512397/house-passes-most-significant-gun-bill-in-2-
decades.  
 157   Devlin Barrett, et. al., FBI’s Gun Background-Check Database is Missing Records of 
Millions of Cases, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2017, 10:41 PM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-fbi-gun-background-check-system-
missing-records-20171110-story.html.  
 158   Id.  
 159   David Johnson, The Gun Loophole Congress Isn’t Talking About Put 4,170 Guns in 
Wrong Hands in 2016, TIME (Feb. 27, 2018), http://time.com/5170667/charleston-loophole-
fix-nics/.  
 160   Marion Hammer, Universal Background Checks – Absolutely Not, NRA-ILA (Jan. 
25, 2013), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20130125/universal-background-checks-
absolutely-not-1.  
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doing nothing.161  He implored the nation to recognize that while there are 
no individual regulations or combination of laws that will prevent every 
senseless act of violence, “We know such violence has terrible consequences 
for our society.  And if there is even one thing that we can do to prevent any 
of these events, we have a deep obligation—all of us—to try.”162 
 
 
 161   See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in a Press Conference, (Dec. 
19, 2012, 12:02 PM) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2012/12/19/remarks-president-press-conference). 
 162   Id.  
